This article is sponsored by S&P Dow Jones Indices.
By Aye M. Soe, CFA
Senior Director, Index Research & Design
At the heart of the active versus passive management debate lies the theoretical underpinning that the average return of both actively and passively managed assets must equal the aggregate market, thereby making it a zero-sum game. Since the costs of active management typically exceed those of passive management, the average actively managed dollar will underperform the average passively managed dollar after accounting for costs (Sharpe 1991). Over the past few decades, this debate has inspired many passionate believers on both sides, exhibiting its staying power as one of the more hotly contested financial theories.
As a way to keep score of the ongoing debate, S&P Dow Jones Indices (S&P DJI) started publishing the S&P Indices Versus Active (SPIVA®) Scorecard for the U.S in 2002. The scorecard measures the performance of actively managed domestic equity funds across various market capitalizations and styles, as well as fixed income funds, relative to their respective benchmarks. Results can vary on a year-over-year basis due to market conditions, with indices losing out to active funds in one year but winning in a subsequent year. However, the scorecard shows that over a longer-term investment horizon, most active managers have a difficult time outperforming their respective benchmarks. The five-year performance figures show the consistent losing pattern across most equity and several fixed income categories. In addition, the report dispels myths surrounding “inefficient” markets such as small caps and the emerging markets equities, the two areas in which active investing is perceived to offer opportunities due to the mispricing of securities.
The summer of 2014 marks the inaugural launch of the SPIVA Europe Scorecard, which will be released semi-annually. The report measures the performance of actively managed European equity funds denominated in Euro and British pound sterling against their respective benchmarks over one-, three- and five-year horizons as of December 31, 2013. While the report will not end the debate on active versus passive investing in Europe, it aims to make a meaningful contribution by examining the effectiveness of passive investing in the various European market segments.
Similar to the U.S. scorecard, the European edition highlights that a bull market cycle does not guarantee outperformance of active funds. The year 2013 marked a remarkable rebound for the European equity markets, as measured by the 20.97% gain of the S&P Europe 350 Index. During the same period, the majority of the euro-denominated actively managed funds (60.69%) invested in European equities underperformed the benchmark. Similarly, over three quarters (78.92%) of the funds invested in Eurozone equities failed to keep pace with their respective benchmark. The longer-term five-year data does not favor actively managed funds investing in European and Eurozone equities either. More than 60% of European equity funds and nearly 79% of Eurozone equity funds denominated in Euro underperformed the benchmarks.
Unlike Euro-denominated performance figures, which show the effectiveness of indexing unequivocally across most categories, British pound-denominated active funds exhibit mixed results depending on the category. Over near-, mid- and long-term investment horizons, most U.K. and European equities funds have posted better returns than the benchmark, indicating that active management opportunities are present in the space.
Lastly, the SPIVA Europe Scorecard seeks to address whether emerging market equities are an asset that can be effectively accessed via passive investing. The scorecard shows that regardless of the currency denomination of the funds, a significant majority of the actively managed funds investing in emerging markets equities fail to deliver higher returns than the benchmark over near-, mid- and longer-term horizons. For example, 87.65% of funds denominated in EUR and 62.5% of funds in GBP underperformed their benchmark. The results, therefore, attest that passive investing is a viable option for the European market when it comes to emerging markets equities.
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, investors across the globe are increasingly concerned not just with relative performance but also the costs incurred in seeking relative performance. As such, it is only natural that the active versus passive debate will continue to spark discussion. Against that backdrop, S&P DJI aims to become an objective scorekeeper of the debate by regularly examining which pockets of the European market work better for one strategy than the other.
S&P Indices Versus Active Funds (SPIVA®) Europe Scorecard is available here. See the Scorecard
How Do Public Pension Funds Invest?
This article is sponsored by State Street.
Public Pension Funds (PPFs) are highly idiosyncratic and distinct from other types of institutional investors. The universe of investors that fall within our definition of a PPF is numerous and varied. We count 115 institutions in 70 jurisdictions, diverse in geography and economic development. For the purposes of our study, we examined the top 16 funds whose assets constitute just over two-thirds of the total universe. Despite all the idiosyncrasies of PPFs, we have found some shared characteristics in the evolution of their asset allocation over the past decade.
According to our definition, PPFs held around $5.9 trillion in total assets of 2016 and over 4% of all publicly traded assets, making them a significant global investor group. In particular, given their preferences for specific asset classes, their share is disproportionate in some segments. For example, we estimate that by year-end 2016, PPFs owned over 7% of global tradeable fixed income assets (including 8% government bonds and over 13% of inflation-linked bonds) and over 3% of listed public equities.
Similar to other asset owners, PPFs have undertaken a major reallocation of assets over the past decade. However, the motivating driver has not only been the low yield environment, but also changing regulatory and macro policy settings, which either permitted or encouraged greater diversification along asset classes and geographical exposure.
In detail, the most dominant trend has been the move away from holding domestic (local currency) bonds; in their place, PPFs have redeployed assets towards equities and alternatives, with a small share also diverted into foreign bonds. These allocation trends have been almost universal despite a huge diversity of geography and economic development.
It is important to acknowledge how much this investor group has changed over the past decade, with the asset pool growing by over 40% in dollar terms, and even more if measured in local currencies. While some funds are still predominantly captive buyers of government debt, the bulk of PPFs have been transforming into financial institutions with independent firepower and income-generating capacity. The long-term trend towards more diversified fixed income portfolios is likely to continue, as is the shift towards taking on more risk via equity allocations, subject as ever to changes in market cycles. In this context, we expect most PPFs to not only continue taking on more risk overall, but to further internationalise their portfolios.
Finally, one consideration is that maturing funds catering for aging populations will have to make further adjustments to their asset allocations to account for changing cash flow directions and seek greater contributions and investment returns to bridge any funding gaps.
All information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but its accuracy is not guaranteed. There is no representation or warranty as to the current accuracy, reliability or completeness of, nor liability for, decisions based on such information and it should not be relied on as such.
This document may contain certain statements deemed to be forward-looking statements. All statements, other than historical facts, contained within this document that address activities, events or developments that SSGA expects, believes or anticipates will or may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. Please note that any such statements are not guarantees of any future performance and that actual results or developments may differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements.
Tracking Code: 2172159.1.1.GBL.RTL
By clicking on the link to view the report, you acknowledge you are an institutional investor or other accredited investor.
Elliot Hentov, Ph.D. Head of Policy and Research, Official Institutions Group Elliot_Hentov@ssga.com
Alexander Petrov Policy and Research, Official Institutions Group Alexander_Petrov@ssga.com
Sejal Odedra Business Analyst, Client Strategy, Official Institutions Group Sejal_Odedra@ssga.com
The Slings and Arrows of Passive Fortune
This article is sponsored by S&P DJI.
If a tale were to be written regaling us with the popular exploits of the modern day active manager in his quest for alpha across the many peaks and valleys of the financial world, passive investment would likely feature prominently in the telling. Passively managed assets have grown tremendously since their introduction in the 1970s to command some 20% of the U.S. stock’s market total-float adjusted capitalization, drawing a deluge of criticism in recent years from proponents of a more traditional, active approach who charge indexers with all manner of supposed ills – from encouraging collusive behavior and exacerbating pricing inefficiencies, to indifference on matters of corporate governance.
But are passive assets and their purveyors really the threat to markets that active management makes them out to be? Or are the problems attributed to their rise merely a reflection of the market forces all participants must face? These are the questions posed by Anu Ganti and Craig Lazzara at S&P Dow Jones Indices (S&P DJI) in their new paper, titled “The Slings and Arrows of Passive Fortune,” which seeks to unravel some of the most pervasive myths surrounding the growing role of index funds, highlight the immense value they bring to asset owners, and posits a future of asymmetric equilibrium between the old and the new that puts each in their proper place based on relative – rather than absolute – performance.
Nobody – including the paper’s authors – denies that index-based investment has made life more challenging for active managers, who count alpha as their very lifeblood; but so too would it be foolish to argue its advancement as one of the most important developments in modern financial history is without merit, or somehow Thucydidean in nature. If anything, active management can and should expect its portion of the pie (which, it must be pointed out, constitutes the majority of assets by a wide margin) to remain subject to nibbles from their passive counterparts – nibbles that may, with time, diminish. The market always has room for more players at the table, after all, and we all play by its rules.
As Director and Managing Director of index investment strategy team at S&P DJI, Ganti and Lazzara provide research and commentary on the firm’s entire product set – covering U.S. and global equities, commodities, fixed income, and economic indices. Both are chartered financial analysts and regular contributors to Indexology, S&P DJI’s appropriately named blog covering developments in the world of indexing.
Battea: 2017 Securities Class Action Industry Lookback and Observations
This article is sponsored by Battea.
There has been incredible growth in securities and antitrust class action litigations and settlements, particularly as they have unfolded in 2016 and 2017. The number of new cases and settlements from traditional securities litigation to antitrust rate rigging, spread inflation and other forms of collusion are at an all time high and shows no signs of slowing down.
With several multi-billion dollar litigations related to Libor, Euribor and Tibor rates, and spread manipulations, the securities, foreign exchange and antitrust class and collective actions litigation space rose exponentially in 2017.
View Whitepaper Here
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